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Tort Law-CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE DOES NOT EXTEND To DEFAMATION
CONCERNING A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL ON A PUBLIC IssuE-Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
In a libel action at common law,' proof of a defamatory publication
established liability unless either truth or privilege could be shown. Dam-
age to the plaintiff's reputation was presumed, entitling him to general
damages. In the United States, the punishment of libelous words did not
raise a constitutional problem,3 although the Constitution prevented re-
straint of publication.4
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 created a constitutional privilege
against defamation actions brought by public officials without a showing
of actual malice.' A plurality of the Supreme Court extended the Sullivan
1. For a general survey of the historical development of the law of defamation, see W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 111, at 737-38 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT OF
ToRTs § 568 comment b at 159 (1938); Carr, The English Law of Defamation, 18 L.Q. REv.
255, 388 (1902); Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 40
L.Q. REv. 302, 397 (1924); Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 371
(1969); Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 546
(1903).
2. A defamatory statement usually is regarded as " . . . one which tends to hold the
plaintiff up to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided." W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 739 (4th ed. 1971). However, since this
definition disregards those defamatory statements which arouse pity or sympathy, it is too
narrow, and should include statements which". . injure 'reputation' in the popular sense."
Id.
3. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
4. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,
462 (1907); Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313, 3 Pick. 304, 313-14 (1825); Res-
publica v. Oswald, 1 L.Ed. 317, 323-25, 1 Dall. 319, 325 (Penn. 1788).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This constitutional privilege was eventually extended to public
officials involved in criminal libel actions. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); all
public employees, Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); public figures, Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); and to false-light right of privacy actions, Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). A false-light right of privacy action exists where the defendant has
invaded the plaintiff's right of privacy by publicity which places the plaintiff in a false-light
in the public eye.
6. Actual malice is used here in the sense that there existed knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth. The decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
has been viewed as the elevation of the minority view of the fair comment doctrine. See
Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming Newsworthiness Privilege in
Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 371, 377 (1970); Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11
Wm. & MARY L. REV. 371, 392 (1969). At common law there existed a qualified privilege in
defamation suits to comment upon the credentials and conduct of public figures, public
officials, or any matter of public interest. However, there existed disagreement over whether
the fair comment doctrine should be limited to opinions and comment, or whether it should
also encompass false statements of fact. The majority view, as expressed in the leading case
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standard to a libel action brought by a private individual when the event
was of public or general concern.'
In the recent case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,8 the Supreme Court
was faced with the issue of whether or not to apply the Sullivan standard
to any publication involving a matter of public interest without regard to
the status of the person defamed. Gertz, the petitioner, represented the
family of a young man who had been shot and killed by a Chicago police-
man.' Respondent published an article about the policeman which con-
tained several defamatory falsehoods concerning Gertz. The article
claimed that the police officer was being framed as part of a nationwide
conspiracy to discredit local police agencies 0 and labeled Gertz as a
"communist-frontor" engineering the "frame-up."
The district court" held that "the subject matter of 'Frame-Up' 2 was
of Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893), held that it was restricted to
opinion and comment. Whereas, the minority view as best stated in Coleman v. MacLennan,
78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908), allowed the privilege to encompass facts relating to public
officials and their public conduct, even though the facts were untrue. For additional explana-
tion of the fair comment doctrine see W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToaRS § 118 (4th
ed. 1971); Note, Fair Comment, 62 HAnv. L. Rxv. 1207 (1949).
7. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971). In Rosenbloom the Court was
faced with an issue similar to that in the instant case: whether the Sullivan standard
(knowledge-of-falsity-reckless-disregard-for-truth) should apply to a libel action brought by
a private individual for a defamatory falsehood in an issue of public concern. Here, petitioner,
a distributor of nudist magazines, was arrested during a police crack-down on violators of
municipal obscenity statutes. Shortly thereafter, his home and a rented warehouse containing
these magazines were subjected to a lawful search and seizure. Respondent's radio station
aired news reports on these confiscations without styling the material "reportedly" or "alleg-
edly" obscene. Petitioner, following an acquittal on criminal charges, filed a libel action
against respondent. The jury in the district court awarded petitioner $25,000 in general
damages and $750,000 in punitive damages (later reduced to $250,000 on remittitur). The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the Sullivan standard applied.
The Supreme Court, in a plurality decision, affirmed, holding that in "a libel action ...
by a private individual ... for a defamatory falsehood in a newscast relating to his involve-
ment in an event of public or general concern may be sustained only upon clear and convinc-
ing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published ... with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not." Id. at 52.
8. 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
9. In his capacity as a lawyer, Gertz had attended the coroner's inquest into the death of
Nelson, the decedent, and had instituted the various civil actions against Nuccio, the police
officer.
10. The purported goal of this conspiracy was the creation of a national police force capable
of introducing a communist regime.
11. 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970). The district court had initially ruled that Gertz was
neither a "public official" nor a "public figure," therefore, the constitutional privilege as
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clearly one of public interest protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments.' 3 The court of appeals 4 affirmed, holding that the subject
matter was of significant public interest 5 and that the petitioner had failed
to establish actual malice demanded by the constitutional standard.
Reversing the court of appeals, Justice Powell writing for the Court 7
recognized that the underlying concern in the case was the struggle "to
define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the
freedoms of speech and press ... ."' The Supreme Court reaffirmed the
reconciliation of these two societal values in relation to public officials"
and to public figures,"5 but refused to extend the Sullivan rule to protect
publishers in defamation actions brought by private individuals solely
where the matter is of public interest, without regard to the individual's
public status. This eliminates the difficulty of determining whether an
issue amounted to one of "general or public interest."'"
enunciated in Sullivan was inapplicable. It also ruled that the article was libelous per se, thus
leaving the jury with only the issue of damages. The jury returned a $25,000 award for the
petitioner, but the court in an apparent afterthought granted the respondent's motion for
judgement notwithstanding the verdict, on the basis that the constitutional privilege was
raised due to the fact that the subject matter was of "public concern."
12. This is the title of the article in which the defamatory falsehoods concerning Gertz were
published.
13. 322 F. Supp. at 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
14. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
15. Id. at 805.
16. Id. at 807. Actual malice is used here in the sense of the knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for truth. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
17. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stewart.
Justice Blackmun concurred in the opinion. Chief Justice Burger filed a separate dissent, as
did Justices Brennan, Douglas, and White.
18. 94 S. Ct. at 3000. Although this struggle can be seen in the divergent opinions filed in
both Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), and in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974), both Douglas and Black have historically considered the struggle to be
hopeless. Justice Douglas reasons that the first amendment protection is absolute, therefore
it cannot be accomodated with the law of defamation. Id. at 3015 (dissenting opinion). See
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170-72 (1967) (Black, J., concurring); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); and New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) [collected in Justice Powell's
opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 94 S. Ct. at 3007-08].
19. 94 S. Ct. at 3008.
20. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
21. 94 S. Ct. at 3010. Justice Brennan's dissent rejected the view that the Rosenbloom
extension would require a tedious judicial determination of whether an issue was one of
"general or public interest." The basis of Justice Brennan's argument is that the courts in
making this determination would only be fulfilling their traditional role of arbitrating "all
[Vol. 9:394
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This holding recognized that avoidance of self-censorship by the media,
must be balanced with the state's legitimate interest in compensating
injury inflicted by defamatory falsehoods.' This state interest is greater in
protecting private individuals than public individuals, because self-help is
the first step in minimizing the injury to reputation done by a defamatory
falsehood.2 Private individuals however, are hampered in this effort be-
cause they lack access to communicative channels to rebut false allega-
tions, and thus are more vulnerable than public persons.24 Furthermore,
private persons are more deserving of recovery because they have not vol-
untarily thrust themselves into the public arena,2 whereas, the public
person has assumed or consented "to increased risk of injury from defama-
tory falsehoods."26
Consonant with the Court's avowed intention to reconcile the law of
defamation with the values of the first amendment, it restricted the liabil-
ity imposed by the states to compensation for actual injury.- This limita-
disputes concerning clashes of constitutional values." Id. at 3021. Furthermore, this job has
been reduced due to the body of law interpreting what is a public concern, both before and
after Rosenbloom. Id.
22. Id. at 3007-09. Justice Powell cited Justice Stewart's opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 92-93 (1963), in noting that the protection of the personal dignity of each individual
is primarily left to the states.
23. 94 S. Ct. at 3009.
24. Id. Justice Brennan in his dissent strongly disagreed with this rationale. Id. at 3018-
19. The basis of his disagreement, which he referred to, was expressed in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) where the Court said:
While the argument that public figures need less protection because they can com-
mand media attention to counter criticism may be true for some very prominent
people, even then it is the rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge. Id.
at 46.
Justice Brennan suggested that the states should ensure a citizen the right to respond,
instead of "stifling public discussion of matters of public concern." Id. at 47. For a general
discussion of the argument in favor of retraction and right-of-reply statutes see Donnelly, The
Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 867 (1948); Pedrick,
Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CoaRNEL
L.Q. 581, 605-08 (1964); Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 H.& v.
L. REv. 1730 (1967).
25. 94 S. Ct. at 3010. Justice Brennan, again, failed to see the logic of this argument. Id.
at 3019. Referring back to his opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48
(1971), Justice Brennan argued that due to the interaction of today's society, "[violuntarily
or not we all are 'public' men to some degree."
26. 94 S. Ct. at 3010.
27. Id. at 3011-12. This holding represents, as does most of Justice Powell's opinion, the
adoption of the Marshall-Stewart dissent in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
78 (1971). The basic rationale for limiting recovery to compensation for actual injury is that
punitive and presumed damages act not only as "windfalls" to the plaintiff, but also, can
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tion is in line with the Court's feeling that a strict liability standard for
the media would create an unacceptable degree of self-censorship." The
Court did indicate, however, that if the plaintiff desires recovery of pre-
sumed and punitive damages, this can be accomplished by meeting the
more rigorous standard of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
truth" enunciated in Sullivan."
Gertz represents the adoption of a compromise between the law of defa-
mation and the competing values protected by the first amendment.',
Basically, the defendant-publisher is denied the protection of a constitu-
tional privilege and the plaintiff is restricted to recovery of compensation
for actual injuries, thus effectively defining the outer reaches of the
Sullivan constitutional privilege, and changing the common law doctrine
relating to damages."
As a compromise decision, Gertz offers the advantage of being a defini-
tive ruling clarifying the uncertainty previously existing in this area of the
law.3 From the media's perspective this decision relieves it from the threat
cause self-censorship of the press. Id. at 84. See Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Pub-
lic's Right to Know: A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 630, 648
(1968).
Justice White attacked this holding, in his dissent, by noting that the self-censorship
argument is not viable because an occasional damage award does not intimidate the media
industry. 94 S. Ct. at 3032. Furthermore, although Justice Powell included a rather open-
ended definition of "actual injuries," proof of damage to reputation is exceedingly difficult
to establish. Id. at 3033. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.30 (1956); W.
PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 765 (4th ed. 1971).
28. 94 S. Ct. at 3011.
29. Id.
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. 94 S. Ct. at 3000.
32. The changes in the area of damages, implemented by Gertz, were strongly criticized
in Justice White's scholarly dissent. White noted that "the Court, in a few printed pages,
has federalized major aspects of libel law by declaring unconstitutional in important respects
the prevailing defamation law in all or most of the 50 States." 94 S. Ct. at 3022. Justice White
charged the majority with "judicial overkill" and characterized its opinion as follows:
[Y]ielding to the apparently irresistible impulse to announce a new and different
interpretation of the First Amendment, the Court discards history and precedent in
its rush to refashion defamation law in accordance with the inclinations of a perhaps
evanescent majority of the Justices. Id. at 3027.
33. A number of jurisdictions applied the Rosenbloom extension to a variety of situations
deemed of "general or public interest." See, e.g., New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United
States, 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974) (winning numbers in New Jersey lottery); Berry v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., Inc., 480 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1973) (murder); Porter v. Guam Publica-
tions, Inc., 475 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973) (theft); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712 (5th
Cir. 1972) (electronic eavesdropping); Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co.,
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of large and often unwarranted presumed and punitive damages.34 Never-
theless, there still remains an opportunity for the plaintiff to recover com-
pensation for actual injuries.
Unfortunately the effect of this decision makes recovery for the private
individual difficult. Although Justice Powell noted that a dollar and cents
value need not be assigned to the actual injuries, all awards must be
supported by competent evidence. It is submitted that the damage done
to one's reputation rarely is susceptible of concrete proof and, therefore,
Gertz will either discourage the bringing of defamation actions of this
nature, or negate those brought due to the difficulty of establishing actual
injuries by competent evidence. 3 Attempting to mitigate this effect, Jus-
tice Powell observed that actual injury includes numerous types of dam-
ages such as mental anguish, humiliation, and injury done to one's stand-
ing and reputation in the community.37 However, these concepts are elu-
sive and difficult to prove. Therefore, Gertz will heavily favor the media,
unless the courts are willing to broadly interpret the meaning of competent
evidence.
L.T.S.
454 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (established church's activities in real estate). Contra, Hood
v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973) (credit report held not to be a matter
of general or public interest).
34. Justice White was not persuaded by this argument and observed the following:
Not content with escalating the threshold requirements of establishing liability, the
Court abolishes the ordinary damages rule, undisturbed by New York Times and later
cases, that, as to libels or slanders defamatory on their face, injury to reputation is
presumed and general damages may be awarded along with whatever special damages
may be sought. Apparently because the Court feels that in some unspecified and
unknown number of cases, plaintiffs recover where they have suffered no injury or
recover more than they deserve, it dismisses this rule as an "oddity of tort law." 94 S.
Ct. at 3033.
35. Id. at 3012.
36. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMiES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 5.30, at 468 (1956).
Actual damage to reputation may be suffered although the plaintiff may be unable
to prove it. By the very nature of the harm resulting from defamatory publications, it
is frequently not susceptible of objective proof. Libel and slander work their evil in
ways that are invidious and subtle. The door of opportunity may be closed to the victim
without his knowledge, his business or professional career limited by the operation of
forces which he cannot identify but which, nonetheless, were set in motion by the
defamatory statements. Id.
37. 94 S. Ct. at 3012.
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